With the challenges the world faces in the field of environmental policy, the research on complex interdependencies in world politics and transnational policy-making has been intensified. Several institutions came into existence in response to the increasing concerns about global climate change. This paper analyzes the structure of the parties involved in regulating climate conventions and treaties, and design instruments for allocating responsibility to them. In order to point out possibilities of allocating responsibility, the relationship between power and responsibility is examined. By applying power measures, we estimate the impact of the various agents in these contractual or instrumental arrangements taking a priori unions into consideration. We examine the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification. Depending on the decision topics the developing countries hold more power and responsibility than the developed countries. Both conventions refer to responsibilities of the parties as common but differentiated responsibilities. The primary responsibilities and thus power should fall to the industrial countries which is not reflected in our calculations.
Introduction
Efforts of creating an international regime which adresses the problem of global climate change have been under way since 1990. Governments had problems finding policies that concur with the request of electoral politics and at the same time satisfy the needs for global responsi- Braham (2005) .). Holler (2007) analysed the relation between the concept of freedom of choice, the concept of power and responsibility. The standard theory of ranking opportunity sets was elaborated such that the Public Good Index can be applied to evaluate the rankings from the point of view of the decision makers. This paper makes use of this conceptual framework and discusses responsibility in the collective decision making bodies regulating the climate conventions and treaties refered above. In this study, we consider the possibility of a priori unions within the sets of decision makers. For the UNFCCC the decision rule is a unanimity one and for the UNCCD there is a twothird majority decision rule. There are equal voting weights. Voting power and responsibility are thus equally distributed amongst the parties of the conventions if we do not consider a priori unions. We define ten a priori unions and apply corresponding a priori power measures.
Depending on the decision topics the developing countries hold more voting power and therefore responsibility than the developed countries.
Both conventions refer to responsibilities of the parties as common but differentiated responsibilities. 1 There are convincing arguments that 1 The meaning of 'common responsibility' is understood by analogy with some known and accepted concepts like common good, common interest or common concern of humankind. The 'differentiated responsibility' component can be approached from two perspectives, the different contributions to the causes of environmental harm and the different capacities to respond to environmental threats. (Timoshenko (2003) ) the primary responsibilities should fall to the industrial countries which is not reflected in our calculations. Goodin (1998) proposed task responsibility that specifies 'whose job it is to see to it that certain things are performed and that certain things are accomplished' (p.150). To accomplish things however presupposes that those are held responsible that can do it. This of course points to the developed countries when it comes to deal with climate change and its costly implications. It seems that a possible solution for an adequate allocation of responsibility could be a reallocation in power.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we provide the analytical tools such as simple games, power indices and games with a priori unions. In section 3 we summarize the relationship of freedom of choice, the concept of power and responsibility. Sections 4 and 5 contain an illustration of the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Convention to Combat Desertification. Section 6 discusses the results of the power measurements. In section 7 we define the a priori unions and display the a priori power and responsibility . In section 8 we dicuss the responsibility and power results and compare them with the definition of responsibility given in the context of the Conventions after we conclude in section 9.
Preliminaries

Simple Games
A simple game is a pair (N, W ) where N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of players and W is a set of subsets of N satisfying:
• ∅ ∈ W, N ∈ W, and • the monotonicity property, i.e., 
The Public Good Index
Based on the assumptions that coalitional values are public goods and only minimal winning coalitions are relevant when it comes to power, the Public Good Index (PGI) proposed by Holler (1982) and formalized in Holler and Packel (1983) assigns power proportional to the number of MWCs a player belongs to. It is assumed that the coalitions that are not MWCs are irrelevant when it comes to measuring power and therefore should not be taken into consideration. That is, other winning coalitions apart from MWCs can form but, as they contain surplus players, hold a potential of free-riding when coaltitions determine the production of public goods. Therefore, the PGI focuses on MWCs.
Given a simple game (N, W ), the PGI assigns to each player i ∈ N the real number:
This implies i∈N δ i (N, W ) = 1.
Games with a priori unions
The definition of (1) implies that all MWCs are equally likely and no a priori unions of some members of the decision making body under consideration exist. However, if the second assumption does not hold the concept of a game with a priori unions applies.
For a set of players N , we will denote by P (N ) the set of all partitions of N . An element P = {P 1 , . . . , P u } ∈ P (N ) is called a coalition structure, that is, a set of nonempty and mutually disjoint subsets of N whose union coincides with N . It describes the a priori unions on N . We also use P as the mapping assigning each player i the union P (i) ∈ P he is a member of. A simple game with a coalition structure is a triple (N, W, P ), that is, a set of players N , set of winnning coalitions W and a coalition structure P on N .
We denote by SIU the set of simple games with a priori unions and by SIU (N ) the set of simple games with a priori unions and player set N . Given such a game, the corresponding quotient game is the simple game (U, W ), where the player set U = {1, . . . , u} represents the unions and W is the set of winning coalitions. A coalition R ⊆ U in the quotient game is winning if the coalition of represented unions k∈R P k is winning in (N, W ). We denote the set of minimal winning coalitions in the quotient game by M W and M W k describes the set of minimal winning coalitions containing union k ∈ U .
A coalitional power index is a mapping f assigning each simple game with a coalition structure (N, W, P ) to an n-dimensional real valued vector f (N, W, P ) = (f 1 (N, W, P ), . . . , f n (N, W, P )). Both measures consider two levels of negotiation. In the first step, they distribute the power among the a priori unions in accordance with the PGI of the quotient game. On the second level, they assign the power of a union to its members. There are alternative concepts to assign a solution to this problem. In this paper, we will analyse this problem in accordance to the Solidarity PGI as for our special case its results coincide with the results that derive from applying the Owen extended PGI.
The Public Good Index for A Priori Unions
The Solidarity PGI Υ allocates the power of an a priori union to its members by assigning each union member equal power, that is for
The first term of the last equality coincides with the PGI of the union P k in the quotient game. The term 1 |P k | indicates that the payoff for player i is the same as for the other players of the a priori union P k .The fact that this term looks like sharing the power is due to normalization that implies i∈N Υ i (N, W, P ) = 1. 2 But as the latter ones also coincide with the Solidarity PGIwe just considered the Union PGI and the Solidarity PGI for our calculations below.
The Union PGI Λ is as close as possible to the original spirit of the PGI, it is based on the two assumptions that the coalitional value is a public good and only minimal winning coalitions are relevant. The latter assumption does, however, apply to coalitions being minimal also with respect to the simple game and with respect to the coalition structure. A player's power is hence proportional to the number of minimal winning coalitions his union is a member of in the quotient game, that is,
As with the Solidarity PGI, it is obviously the case that all members of the same union have equal power, that is, the Union PGI as well satisfies the solidarity property. A basis of the PGI is that each element in M W stands for a different collective good and the winning coalition that forms will pick one of it. So the elements of the set of minimum winning coalitions will be related to the elements of the opportunity set X. This approach connects the players with the opportunity sets and suggests to express the freedom of choice by power as measured by the Public Good Index. As power is a potential, the freedom of choice that is considered in this case is a potential as well. Membership of coalitions can also be interpreted as a proxy of the responsibility of the individual decision maker for the social outcome. Social responsibility is a potential whereas individual responsibility derives from choices.
So it is not just adding up individual responsibility when the Public Good Index is used. When player i has power, he has a potential impact on the social outcome and thus he is socially responsible for it. This may imply that i can do something while others cannot.
Player i is individually responsible when he decides to act, and this action together with other agents possible actions determined the social outcome. Of course players also bear legal and political responsibility.
If we consider the possibility of a priori unions it will be interesting to see whether the responsibility of a single player will change. If a priori unions exist it seems plausible to apply a power measure that takes them into account. But if a union is not part of the MWC that finally forms and picks a social outcome, does it still hold some responsibility for that outcome? It had the opportunity to form a coalition with some of the unions which are part of the winning coalition itself, and thus it had the potential to force a different social outcome. It 
Bodies of the Convention
The is not part of it, through publishing comprehensive reviews every five years of the status of climate change and climate-change science, along with special reports and technical papers on request.
Actors in the Negotiation Process
The member countries of the convention take decisions at sessions of the COP. In order to increase their influence member countries often form alliances during negotiations. The Conference has several groupings representing the concerns of developing countries, least-developed countries, small-island states, Europe (through the European Union), non-European industrialized nations, oil-exporting nations, and nations committed to 'environmental integrity'.
Other actors are the 'Observers' which are groups and agencies who allowed to attend at international meetings. Although the term 'Observers' is used, these groups can speak at these meetings. However, Observers also include a lively crowd of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). These represent business and industrial interests, environmental groups, local governments, research and academic institutes, religious bodies, labour organizations, and population groups such as representatives of indigenous peoples. In order to be identified as an observer, NGOs must be legally constituted not-for-profit entities, competent in matters related to the Convention. Currently, more than 600 NGOs are identified as such to participate in meetings related to the Convention.
Countries, i.e. their representatives, also get extensive input from other sources, both through official channels and in behind-the-scenes chatter. This is not surprising, considering that the global climate is facing a major threat, coastlines and even countries may disappear, not to mention that millions of dollars are being allocated for programmes and activities. This of course attracts all kinds of groups that will attempt to influence the outcome of the Convention.
United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
The second institution we will investigate is the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD). That is a convention to combat desertification and reduce the effects of drought. The UNCCD tries to achieve its goal through national action programs that incorpo- 
Power and Responsibilty Measurement
As the decision rule for the UNFCCC is an unanimity rule the a priori inside the UNFCCC must be adopted by consensus. This is not quite the same as unanimity. Here the will of the Chair 6 and his or her 6 The chair is elected by the Parties to chair the Committee of the Whole or one of the subsidiary ability to reflect consensus take precedence. For example, the Chair may decide to ignore a party's objection, or a party may choose not to object formally to a decision, but to ask for its concerns to be taken note of in the report on the session.
We calculate the passage probability 7 by dividing the number of winning coalition by the number of possible coalitions. For the UN-FCCC there is just one possible winning coalition and that is the one containing all the member states. Therefore the passage probability and thus efficiency is minimal. The assertiveness of new decisions compared to the status quo is minimal in the UNFCCC.
However, the a priori voting power of the members of the UNCCD and UNFCCC is likely to differ if one considers a priori unions and a priori power. As a consequence responsibility should change as well.
A Priori Unions
The member parties of the climate change regime (the UNCCD as well as the UNFCCC) are organized into a number of different groups and coalitions. Established practise in the UN system divides UN members into five regional groups: Africa, Asia, Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), Latin America and the Caribbean (GRULAC) and bodies. He is responsible for facilitating progress towards an agreement. 7 Baldwin and Widgrén (2004) refer to the passage probability for measuring the EU's decision making efficiency. 
Western Europe and others (WEOG). The fifth group includes
A Priori Power and Responsibility
We will now compute two a priori versions of the PGI to analyze the UNCCD. It is adequate to focuse on this institution because the parties of the UNCCD overlap closely with those of the UNFCCC. (As the UNFCCC decision making underlies an unanimity rule, the assertiveness of new decisions compared to the status quo is minimal in the UNFCCC.) We consider 193 players (member states). If we abstract from a priori unions, the UNCCD can be represented as the following weighted two-third majority game: 129 : 1, 1, 1, . . . , 1 
193
].
The corresponding set of minimal winning coalitions, M W , is obvious.
However, if we take likely a priori unions into account, we may divide the parties of the UNCCD such that the following system of a priori unions applies: The justification for the dividing line between the a priori unions is that the second half are unions which contain countries that are in more than one a priori union and that therefore the weights of the a priori unions differ depending on the decision topic. Table 1 shows the alternative partitions P 1, . . . , P 5 and the related voting weights. Table 1 about here The individual member states of the UNCCD are symmetric, inasmuch as they all have the same voting weights. As a consequence, we already argued in section 2.4, the Solidarity PGI, the Owen extended PGI and the three power distributions based on threats coincide. Therefore, we focus on the Solidarity PGI and the Union PGI. Table 2 shows the results of the quotient game of the Solidarity PGI, i.e. the Public Good Index for the different a priori unions with regard to the different weighted systems. For the Solidarity PGI the second step is to devide the assigned union power by the number of members of the respective union. Table 3 about here   Table 3 shows some results for selected member countries according to the Solidarity PGI and the Union PGI. In regards to the Solidarity 
Responsibility and the Conventions
Both, the UNFCCC and the UNCCD, refer to the responsibilities of the parties as 'common but differentiated responsibilities'. Concerning the UNFCCC the shared responsibility of the parties is described as the contribution to the preservation of the global climate system, an obligation which is imposed on them 'for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind' 9 . This is meant to imply that all the major economic and political players in society have a role in implementing the programme, including the general public, both as citizens and consumers. The results show that in most of the considered cases the developing countries have the more voting power than the developed countries.
The differentiated responsibilties as refered in this section are not consistent with the results of section 6. Underlying the theory we used in this paper the developed countries should have more voting power if they should be made more responsible. But is that a fair allocation?
On the one hand, the industrialised countries should be more responsi- 
Institutional framing versus ad hoc decision making
In this paper we analysed the potential impact of the various agents,
i.e., the representatives of member countries, in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD). The stability of climate and collective measures to react on climate changes were considered a public good and it therefore seemed to be straightforward to quantify the impact of the agents on corresponding policies by applying the Public Good Index. UNFCCC decision making requires unanimity and the UNCCD relies on the two-third majority rule. Given that 'one country, one vote' applies for the UNFCCC and the UNCCD, the power calculation is rather trivial: in both cases, the representatives of individual member countries have equal power, although for different reason. In the case of UNFCCC our implicit assumption is that in the long run a qualified majority rule will be introduced, quite similar to what we observed in the decision making of the EU Council of Ministers. Our study is meant to be a first step to deliver a framework for such an institutional change. Moreover, if unanimity no longer dominates and there are more or less stable ties between groups of agents such that a priori unions exist, then the decision situation can be described by a non-trivial weighted voting game and the power distribution is not obvious. In order to exemplify the method and to derive first results we have discussed the power problem for the UNCCD under the pretext that a priori unions can be identified.
The underlying assumption of our study is that, in the long run, inter- * It means that they cannot sell emissions credits to industrialized nations to permit those nations to over-pollute.
* They get money and technologies from the developed countries in Annex II.
Developing countries may volunteer to become Annex I countries when they are sufficiently developed.
Developing countries are not expected to implement their commitments under the Convention unless developed countries supply enough funding and technology, and this has lower priority than economic and social development and dealing with poverty. 
